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1. INTRODUCTION
This case, popularly known as Heyday, was referred to the ECJ by the High Court, which is hearing a claim by  Age  Concern  that
exemptions in the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1031 do not comply  with  the  parent  Council  Directive
2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The central  challenge  is  to  the
default retirement age, provided by reg 30, which permits employers to dismiss workers aged 65 or over simply  on  the  ground  of
‘retirement’. A further challenge is to the objective justification defence for direct discrimination provided by  reg  3,  which  could
be used to justify retirements falling outside of the default retirement age.
The judgment is a major disappointment for all but those familiar with the reference, because it did not decide the central
question of the lawfulness of the default retirement age. Rather than place this question in the hands  of  the  ECJ,  the  High  Court
referred three rather technical issues (couched as five questions). First, whether the Directive applied to the default  retirement  and
objective justification  provisions.  Second,  whether  the  general  justification  defence  for  direct  discrimination  (in  reg  3)  was
compatible with the Directive. Third, whether there was a practical difference between the tests of objective  justification  provided
in the Directive by Article 2(2)(b)(i) (the orthodox formula for  indirect  discrimination)  and  Article  6(1)  (allowing  for  defences
against age discrimination). The ECJ held: (1) the Directive did apply to the  provisions;  (2)  the  Directive  permitted  the  general
justification defence to direct discrimination in reg 3 if the defence itself could be objectively  justified  in  pursuit  of  a  legitimate
social policy aim under Article  6(1);  (3)  the  tests  were  different  in  scope,  but  Article  6(1)  still  demanded  a  measure  to  be
objectively justified ‘to a high standard of proof’.
The significant answers are that the Directive permits a general defence to direct age discrimination (such as  that  in  reg
3), and that justification under Article 6(1) must be in pursuit of a social policy objective. This last aspect is particularly relevant to
the defence to  direct  discrimination  in  reg  3  because  its  general  nature  (permitting  defences  to  unspecified  and  unforeseen
scenarios) makes it hard to square with a social policy objective. The Court offered some general  guidance  on  the  application  of
Article 6 to the defence in reg 3. The judgment was less helpful on the default retirement age. As a specific defence,  there  was  no
question that it fell within Article 6 (once the first issue was resolved). But no guidance was provided on the application of  Article
6(1) to the default retirement age. On the meaning of Article 6(1), the judgment was general, and at times ambiguous, which leaves
it vulnerable to selective interpretation. As such, when the case returns to the High Court to  decide  the  lawfulness  of  the  default
retirement age, the court may find more guidance from previous ECJ case law, than from this judgment.
2. THE LEGISLATION
Article 2(2) of the Directive defines direct and indirect discrimination in the orthodox manner, providing (in paragraph  2(b)(i))  an
objective justification defence for indirect discrimination only. However, Article 6(1) provides a more  specific  defence  for  direct
and indirect age discrimination:
Justification of differences of treatment on grounds of age
Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide  that  differences  of  treatment  on  grounds  of  age  shall  not
constitute discrimination, if, within  the  context  of  national  law,  they  are  objectively  and  reasonably  justified  by  a
legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour  market  and  vocational  training  objectives,  and  if  the
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
Article 6 then offers a non-exhaustive list of three examples of different treatment that could be justified under  this  formula,  none
of which are relevant to this case.
Recital 25 in the preamble appears to explain Article 6(1). It provides:
...  differences  in  treatment  in  connection  with  age   may   be   justified   under   certain
circumstances and therefore require  specific  provisions  which  may  vary  in  accordance
with  the  situation  in  Member  States.  It  is  therefore  essential  to  distinguish   between
differences in treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy,
labour  market  and  vocational  training  objectives,  and  discrimination  which   must   be
prohibited.
Recital 14 states rather cryptically: ‘This Directive shall be without prejudice to  national  provisions  laying  down  retirement
ages.’
Regulation 3 of the Age Regulations 2006 defines direct and indirect discrimination in the orthodox way,  but  unlike  the
‘parallel’ Article 2 of the Directive, it offers the objective justification defence to both indirect and direct discrimination. 
Regulation 30 provides the more specific exception for retirement:
(2) Nothing .... shall render unlawful the dismissal of a person to whom this regulation applies at or  over  the  age  of  65
where the reason for the dismissal is retirement.
This is  the  controversial  default  retirement  age,  a  blanket  exemption  from  the  age  discrimination  principle  available  to  all
employers and permitting dismissal simply on the ground  of  ‘retirement’.  Employers  need  not  provide  any  other  justification.
However, by reg 30(1), this only applies to:
an employee within the meaning of section 230(1) of the [Employment Rights] 1996, a person in Crown  employment,  a
relevant member of the House of Commons staff, and a relevant member of the House of Lords staff.
This is of narrower application than the Regulations  generally.  It  does  not  include,  for  instance,  partnerships.  Regulation  7(4)
provides  a  supplementary  exception  permitting  employers  not  to  recruit  anyone  approaching  (i.e.  within  6  months  of)  the
employer’s normal retirement age, or if it does not have one, 65.
                The defence of objective justification for direct discrimination in reg 3 comes into play where a  retirement  falls  outside
of the default retirement age, for example, retirement of workers under 65 (early retirement), or retirement  from  a  partnership.  In
these cases - unlike the default retirement age - each retirement must be objectively justified.
3. THE FIRST ISSUE - DOES THE DIRECTIVE APPLY?
The first issue for the Court was whether the Directive applied to exemptions from the age discrimination principle. The Court held
(at paras 21-30) that it did, despite Recital 14 of the Preamble, which was confined to ‘the  competence  of  the  Member  States  to
determine retirement age.’ (Citing Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, [44]). This is settled law  and  relatively
uncontroversial, and requires no further comment.
4. THE SECOND ISSUE - RETIREMENT OUTSIDE OF THE DEFAULT RETIREMENT AGE
The next issue was whether the Directive permitted the general objective justification defence  for  direct  discrimination  in  reg  3.
The significance of reg 3 in this context is that it provides a defence for retirement outside of  the  default  retirement  age,  such  as
early retirement or retirement from a partnership. The problem is that reg 3 goes beyond the ‘parallel’ (and orthodox) definition  of
discrimination in the Directive (Article 2), which limits the defence to indirect discrimination. Thus,  Article  6  provided  the  only
possibility of legitimising the broader defence in reg 3.
The Court observed that early retirement could fall under the justification defence in reg  3
(para 34). Age Concern and the EC Commission –  relying  on  Recital  25  (above)  -  argued  that
Article 6 permitted only express specific exemptions to discrimination. The UK (and Italy) argued
that Article 6 permitted a general exemption such as the defence in reg 3. The Court  rejected  Age
Concern’s position, but only went some way to agreeing with the UK. Although Article 6  did  not
require Member States to draw up a specific list of exemptions (para 43), and that  Member  States
retained ‘a broad discretion as to the choice of methods’ of  implementation  of  a  Directive  (para
41), this was provided that the legal position  is  ‘sufficiently  precise  and  clear  and  the  persons
concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights ...’. Perhaps with  reg  3  in  mind,  the  Court
added ‘A directive  may  also  be  implemented  by  way  of  a  general  measure  provided  that  it
satisfies the same conditions’ (para 42).
However,  Article  6  makes  clear  that  such  exceptions   have   to   be   ‘objectively   and
reasonably’  justified.  Of  course,  this  requires  that  the  defence  has  a  legitimate  aim,  and  is
appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim. Further,  the  Court  held,  Article  6  restricts  these
aims to social policy objectives and so ‘By their public interest nature,  [they]  are  distinguishable
from purely individual reasons particular to the employer’s  situation,  such  as  cost  reduction  or
improving competitiveness ... although it cannot be ruled out that a national rule may recognise, in
the pursuit of those legitimate aims, a certain degree of flexibility for employers’ (para  46).  Such
aims may be identified from the ‘general context’ of reg 3 (citing Palacios de la Villa,  [57])  (para
45).
The  Court  offered  some  guidance  on  the  matter  of  whether  the  general   justification
defence for direct discrimination in reg 3 was proportionate, or ‘appropriate and  necessary’.  This
included taking account of other (presumably less discriminatory) means to achieve the aim  (para
50).  The  Court  noted  that  the  broad  discretion  ‘cannot  have   the   effect   of   frustrating   the
implementation  of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  on  grounds  of  age.’  And  that   ‘Mere
generalisations concerning the capacity of a specific measure to contribute to employment  policy,
labour market or vocational training objectives are not enough ... and  do  not  constitute  evidence
on the basis of which it could reasonably be  considered  that  the  means  chosen  are  suitable  for
achieving that aim’ (para 51), citing Case C-167/97  Seymour-Smith  [1999]  ECR  I-623,  [75]  &
[76].
Comment
In practice, this means that before an employer can use the defence in reg 3 to a direct discrimination claim, the defence itself must
be justified by social policy aims in the national interest, not merely the employer’s interest, although  of  course,  on  occasion  the
two could coincide. The restriction to social policy aims places a question mark over the  recent  judgment  in  Seldon  v  Clarkson,
Wright & Jakes [2008]  UKEAT/0063/08,  (a  partnership  case  falling  outside  of  reg  30)  where  it  was  suggested  that  forced
retirement could be justified under reg 3 by the partnership’s aims of promoting a congenial culture in the workplace  (by  avoiding
the indignity of evaluating the performance of older  partners),  and  facilitating  the  expectations  of  junior  associates  to  achieve
partnership.
Back in the High Court, justifying reg 3 could prove problematic for two reasons. The ECJ
indicated that in the absence of an expressed social aim, one could be inferred  from  the  ‘context’
of reg 3. In its first consultation, the  Government  stated  it  would  include  a  general  defence  to
direct discrimination because inter alia it did not ‘want to ban employment  practices  that  can  be
reasonably and objectively justified. Businesses must be able  to  operate  productively’  (Equality
and  Diversity:  Age  Matters  Age  Consultation  2003  URN  03/920  para  3.13).  In  the  second
consultation, it stated: ‘A wide variety  of  aims  may  be  considered  as  legitimate.  ...  Economic
factors such as business needs  and  considerations  of  efficiency  may  also  be  legitimate  aims’.
(‘Equality and diversity: coming of age. Consultation  on  the  draft  Employment  Equality  (Age)
Regulations 2006’ (July 2005) DTI, URN 05/1171, at para 4.1.16)
Thus, the first problem is that the Government considered a range of aims, at least some of
which  are  ‘purely  individual  reasons  particular  to  the  employer’s  situation’,  which   are   not
legitimate. From this context it can be seen that the Government did not consider that the  defence
must be related to a social policy aim (see e.g. ibid para 4.1.1).  The  reason  it  chose  this  general
defence was that in consultation  40%  of  employers  considered  a  prescriptive  list  of  aims  too
restrictive, hence its general nature, allowing ‘a number of other potentially legitimate aims’  (ibid
para 4.1.3-4.1.4). The context also reveals that the  driving  force  behind  the  defence  was  not  a
social policy, but rather the views of some employers, contributing to  the  individual  and  private
nature of its aim.
Second, if one assumed that at  least  one  of  Government’s  aims  could  be  considered  a
social policy objective, it is difficult to see how such a general defence  could  be  appropriate  and
necessary. As it stands, employers could use it for  a  wide  range  of  ‘purely  individual  reasons’.
There exists,  as  the  Court  demanded,  less  discriminatory  alternatives,  such  as  more  specific
defences, more closely related to whatever social aim(s) the Government wishes to pursue; indeed
such defences were enacted for other  aims,  such  as  the  national  minimum  wage  (reg  29)  and
positive discrimination (reg 31).
5. THE THIRD ISSUE - THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 6
The third issue for the Court  was  whether  Article  6(1)  presented  a  different  defence  from  the  standard  defence  of  objective
justification for indirect discrimination afforded by Article 2(2)(b)(i). The Court held there was a difference  ‘in  scope’.  This  was
because, it seems, unlike Article 6,  the  defence  in  Article  2  was  limited  to  indirect  discrimination  (paras  58-60).  The  Court
confirmed that the default retirement age could amount to direct discrimination (para 63), and  so  only  the  meaning  of  Article  6
needed consideration. It held that Article 6:
...allows Member States to introduce into their national law measures providing for differences in  treatment  on  grounds
of age which fall in particular within the category of direct discrimination as defined in Article 2(2)(a).
But this was ‘strictly limited by the conditions laid down in Article 6(1) itself’ (para 62).
Age Concern argued that the phrase ‘objectively and reasonably’ adopted the language of the European Court of  Human
Rights, which required ‘very weighty reasons’ to justify discrimination under the European Convention on Human  Rights,  Article
14.  (See   e.g.   Gaygusuz   v   Austria   [1996]   (1997)   23   EHRR   364   [42]   (nationality   discrimination);   Van   Raalte   v
Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 503 [40] (sex discrimination)). Accordingly, Article 6 imposed ‘a very high standard of scrutiny’  in
line with the ECtHR jurisprudence. The Court rejected this view, reasoning:
it is inconceivable that a difference in treatment could  be  justified  by  a  legitimate  aim,  achieved  by  appropriate  and
necessary means, but that the justification would not be reasonable.
Accordingly, ‘no particular significance should be attached’ to the addition of the word ‘reasonably’ (para 65). However, Article  6
imposed on Member States ‘notwithstanding their broad discretion in matters of social policy’ a ‘high standard of proof’  regarding
the legitimacy of the aim relied upon (para 65). Whether this is ‘higher’ than the orthodox  test,  the  Court  did  not  say,  save  that
where a measure (indirectly discriminating) could be justified under the orthodox test in Article  2(2)(b)(i),  there  was  no  need  to
have recourse Article 6 (para 66). This suggests that Article 6 imposes no higher burden  than  the  standard  formula  in  Article  2.
Finally, the Court reiterated the standard formula that the measure must be in pursuit of a  legitimate  aim  -  ‘such  as  employment
policy, or labour market or vocational  training  objectives’  -  and  be  appropriate  and  necessary  to  achieve  the  aim  (para  67).
Although the Court did not express it in terms, it is implicit from this and its  opinion  on  the  second  issue  (para  46),  that  under
Article 6(1), the legitimate aim is restricted to a social policy objective. Of course, this is another difference from Article 2(2)(b)(i),
which permits employers to cite purely individual reasons to justify indirect discrimination.
Comment
This ruling was helpful so far as it confirmed that the default retirement age amounted - prime facie - to direct  discrimination,  and
could be justified only by social policy objectives under  Article  6.  It  was  less  helpful  on  the  meaning  of  this  justification.  It
repeated the standard formula for justifying a discriminatory social policy. The Member State had a ‘broad discretion’, but this was
qualified with phrases such as ‘a high standard  of  proof’  and  that  exceptions  under  Article  6  were  ‘strictly  limited’,  and  the
suggestion that Article 6 imposed no higher standard of proof than Article 2.  The  resulting  ambiguity  permits  selective  quoting,
and no doubt this will be a feature when the case returns to the UK for a decision on whether the default  retirement  age  is  indeed
objectively justified.
                An example of selective quoting was apparent in an earlier reference, Seymour Smith (above), where  the  challenge  was
to a reduction in unfair dismissal rights that adversely affected women. In its conclusion, the ECJ stated that a  measure  had  to  be
‘suitable’ to achieve the legitimate aim (para 77), although it had earlier stated it had to be ‘suitable  and  necessary’  (para  69).  In
between, with a clear allusion to the Government’s defence in that  particular  case  the  ECJ  observed  that  ‘mere  generalisations
concerning the capacity of a ... measure to encourage recruitment are not enough ...  to  provide  evidence’  to  justify  the  measure
(para 76). Nonetheless, back in the UK, the House of Lords  ignored  the  last  two  passages,  quoting  only  the  first  to  support  a
finding that the test was no longer as stringent as previously thought, and as such the measure was justified despite a  total  absence
of  evidence  from  the  Government  ([2000]  1  CMLR   770   [62]   Lord   Nicholls).   Unlike   in   Seymour-Smith,   the   ECJ   in
Heyday  ventured  no  opinion  on  the  lawfulness  of  the  measure,  and  so  its  judgment  is  even  more  vulnerable  to  selective
interpretation.
6. BACK TO THE HIGH COURT - THE DEFAULT RETIREMENT AGE
The headline question in this case is whether the UK’s default retirement age is lawful. The  ECJ  ‘deliberately’  was  not  asked  to
decide that matter, and indeed had no evidence upon which to offer an opinion (see A-G Mazák’s Opinion, para 21). However,  the
judgment confirmed (the first issue) that retirement exemptions fall within the scope of the Directive, and so the default  retirement
age must be justified under Article 6(1). On the meaning of Article 6, the Court confirmed that the legitimate aim must be  a  social
policy objective, but beyond that it merely repeated - more or less - the standard  formula  for  objective  justification.  And  so  this
reference has provided only limited assistance to the High Court on the lawfulness of the default retirement age.
Previous ECJ case law may provide a little more assistance. The Court has ruled on the lawfulness of  a  state  exemption
from the age discrimination principle on two occasions. In Case  C-144/04  Mangold  v  Helm  [2006]  1  CMLR  43,  German  law
exempted from regulation fixed-term employment contracts for any worker over 52. This relaxation  of  protective  legislation  was
designed to encourage employers to recruit older workers. Its aim was to help older persons find jobs more  easily.  Of  course,  the
more direct result of this measure  was  to  remove  safeguards  for  older  workers,  who  could  now  be  employed  on  temporary
contracts for the rest of their working lives. The ECJ observed: ‘This significant body of workers, determined solely on the basis of
age, is thus in danger,  during  a  substantial  part  of  its  members’  working  life,  of  being  excluded  from  the  benefit  of  stable
employment’ (para 64)  and held that the policy could not be objectively justified because  it  went  beyond  what  was  appropriate
and necessary to help unemployed older workers.
In Palacios de la Villa (above), a worker challenged a Spanish measure permitting compulsory  retirement  ages  to  be
negotiated in collective agreements. The Court found that the aim of ‘checking  unemployment’  was  a  legitimate  one  (para  62).
This was generous because this measure could only redistribute unemployment from the young to the old. On  proportionality,  the
Court stated (para 72):
It does not appear unreasonable for ... a Member State to take the view  that  a  measure  ...
may be appropriate and necessary in order to achieve ... the promotion of full  employment
by facilitating access to the labour market.
Further, the measure did not ‘unduly prejudice’  workers  of  retirement  age  because  compulsory
retirement was subject to  a  worker  being  entitled  to  a  ‘not  unreasonable’  retirement  pension.
‘Moreover’, it enabled trade  unions  and  employers’  organisations  to  agree  ‘with  considerable
flexibility’ a compulsory retirement mechanism that took account of the labour market concerned,
and the specific features of the jobs in question (paras 73-74). Thus, the measure was justified. The generous  view
of the social aim, and the deferral to what the Member State considered reasonable, indicates that, in contrast to Mangold, this  was
a liberal approach.
These  cases  appear  to  represent  two  approaches  to  justifying  age  discrimination:  one  strict  and  one  liberal.   The
Heyday judgment does little to indicate which approach should prevail. Its references to  a  ‘high  standard  of  proof’  and  ‘strictly
limited’ could be cited in favour of the strict approach. However, future courts could just as easily  point  to  the  ‘broad  margin  of
discretion’ repeated in Heyday, and afforded in Palacios de la Villa.
However, Mangold and Palacios de la Villa are reconcilable on one issue at least.  Unlike  in  Mangold,  the  measure  in
Palacios de la Villa was passed with the instigation and/or cooperation of trade  unions  and  employers’  groups,  and  this  clearly
influenced the Court (paras 53, 60, & 74). Similarly, in the United States the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act  1967
(ADEA) permits workers to ‘waive’ their rights, but only, especially for retirement, according to  conditions  that  must  be  strictly
observed: see e.g. Oubre v Entergy Operations 522 US 422 (Sup Ct 1998). Article 6 similarly signals that the law is  more  tolerant
of age discrimination. Precise expressions of this tolerance are provided by the ADEA’s waiver provision  and  the  Palicios  de  la
Villa judgment. By contrast, the law would  be  highly  intolerant  of  an  agreement  to  dismiss  a  worker  on  racial  grounds,  for
instance, an employer paying off a hairdresser because his customers ‘prefer white girls’. Although it appears a universal  principle
that age discrimination is less pernicious, the law’s tolerance - so far - is limited to cases with an element of consent  (see  also,  for
Canada, McKinney v University of Guelph [1990] 3 SCR  229).  The  default  retirement  age  is  a  significant  step  outside  of  the
tolerance to age discrimination shown in Palicios de la Villa and the long-established ADEA 1967.
Of course, the Government will invoke Palacios de la Villa on the ground that it is  a  ‘retirement’  case  and  so  appears
factually closer to Heyday than Mangold. However, Palacios de la  Villa  is  distinguishable.  Consent  is  conspicuously  absent  in
Heyday. Further, the Spanish exemption was subject to the worker’s pension qualification. By contrast, the  UK  exemption  allows
all employers to compel its workers to retire, without consideration of the worker’s pension qualifications; and without any level of
worker-agreement whatsoever. It facilitates even ‘age-hostile’ dismissals, so long as they are labelled ‘retirement’.
In its second consultation, the Government stated that the default retirement age was made with two  social  policy  aims:
employers’ workforce planning and the stability of occupational pension schemes and other work-related  benefits.  (‘Equality  and
diversity: coming  of  age.  Consultation  on  the  draft  Employment  Equality  (Age)  Regulations  2006’  (July  2005)  DTI,  URN
05/1171, para 6.1.15.) It  is  questionable  whether  these  aims  qualify  as  a  social  policy,  because  they  are  to  help  individual
employers and their benefit schemes. However, it is arguable that a compulsory retirement age has a broader societal  impact,  such
as  a  motivation   for   workers   to   save   pre-retirement,   and   a   reduction   in   ‘job-blocking’   (‘Notes   on   the   Regulations’
(http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file27136.pdf), para 100.) Given the ECJ’s deference to member states’ autonomy in  social  matters,
it may well be that these relatively minor factors qualify the policy as a legitimate aim.
On  the  issue  of  proportionality,  the  UK  Government  maintained  that  a   ‘significant’
number of employers use a set retirement age as a necessary part of their workforce planning.  But
the  exemption  covers  all  employers,  not  just  this  ‘significant’  number.  Second,  the  Government  claimed  that  its
consultation showed that without a default retirement age there was risk to the  stability  of  pensions.  No  supporting  evidence  or
extended       reasons       were       given       (see        e.g.        the        Government’s        Regulatory        Impact        Assessments:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file35877.pdf). On the face of it, pension schemes should not suffer if workers carry on  working  and
either draw their pensions, or defer entitlement and continue to contribute to the scheme. This is especially so with the increasingly
common ‘defined contribution’ schemes, where the payout is governed by the size of the fund, rather than external factors, such  as
the final salary used for ‘defined benefit’ schemes. Further, at a time of a ‘pensions crisis’, caused by the  ever-growing  proportion
of retired persons, forced retirement does not appear an appropriate way to achieve general pension stability. Of  course,  situations
may arise where forced retirement becomes a necessary consequence of preserving the pension scheme, say  where  a  restructuring
may  compel  workers  to  retire  to  qualify  for  the  more  generous  old  scheme  (see  e.g.   Bloxham   v   Freshfields   Bruckhaus
Deringer [2007] Pens LR 375 (ET)). But these are isolated cases, requiring specific justification. As with the ‘workforce  planning’
argument, the exemption goes far beyond what is necessary to address these situations. Further, it  appears  to  be  no  more  than  a
‘mere generalisation’ considered inadequate by the ECJ in Seymour-Smith and Heyday.
5. CONCLUSION
For those approaching an unwanted retirement, and those with cases pending the outcome of the  Heyday  litigation,  the  judgment
may appear to be of marginal importance. However, one significant pronouncement was the  restriction  of  any  legitimate  aim  to
social policy objectives. In the context of reg 3, the Government,  and  the  EAT  in  Seldon  v  Clarkson,  seemed  unaware  of  this
restriction. Otherwise, the judgment is of limited importance. This was not the fault of the ECJ, which was confined to  the  limited
questions supplied by the High Court.
The judgment confirms that the Directive applies to the ‘retirement’  exemptions  (regs  30  and  7(4))  and  the  objective
justification defence (reg 3), a point already established in Palacios de la Villa. It stated  that  these  regulations  are  permissible  if
they can be objectively justified according - more or less – to the orthodox criteria usually afforded to social policy  measures.  But
there were ambiguities in the guidance to both issues. For instance, for the objective justification defence  to  direct  discrimination,
the defence had to be ‘sufficiently precise and clear’ for persons to  ‘ascertain  the  full  extent  of  their  rights’  and  yet  a  general
defence may ‘satisfy’ these conditions. Justification of the default retirement age under  Article  6  does  not  involve  a  ‘very  high
standard of scrutiny’, but it will have to be to a ‘high standard of proof’, yet apparently  no  higher  than  the  orthodox  test;  at  the
same time we were reminded of a State’s ‘broad margin of discretion’ in such matters. This guidance is so  vulnerable  to  selective
quoting, that the outcome, as shown by the Seymour-Smith saga, remains unpredictable.
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